The Grand Jury In Virginia by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 20
Fall 9-1-1965
The Grand Jury In Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Grand Jury In Virginia, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 325 (1965),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol22/iss2/20
320 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
REMOVAL OF NAMES
FROM VIRGINIA VOTER REGISTRATION ROLLS
In the national election of 1964, two ballots, one each from Halifax
and Fairfax counties, were found in the Lexington Precinct, Rock-
bridge County, Virginia, ballot box.' This raises the question of
how a ballot from one county was cast in a ballot box of another
county.
To obtain a ballot in Virginia, one must be a registered voter in
the precinct where application for a ballot is made,2 whether pre-
senting one's self in person or applying for an absentee ballot.3 Sim-
ilarly, one must be a registered voter in the precinct where the bal-
lot is cast. 4 The possibility exists, therefore, that the persons who cast
these two ballots were registered voters in two counties.
Since there is no provision for a cross-check of voter lists among
cities and counties in Virginia, it is impossible to determine whether
a person is registered in more than one locality. Even among precincts
within most counties, there is not an official cross-check of voter lists
to determine if any person is registered in more than one precinct.5
Since the trend today is toward enlarging the electorate and making
it easier for transients to vote,6 it appears that the problem of persons
voting in more than one locality may increase.
A factor contributing to the possibility that a person may be
registered to vote in more than one locality is the difficulty of remov-
"Letter from Mrs. Austin M. Drumm, Election Clerk, Lexington Precinct,
Rockbridge County, Virginia, to Donald W. Huffman, March 31, 1965.
Wa. Code Ann. § 24-244 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
Wa. Code Ann. § 24-321 (Supp. 1964).
'Va. Code Ann. §§ 24-248, -341 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
5When a voter moves to a new precinct and makes application to register to
vote in that precinct, he is required to answer whether he has ever voted before
and, if so, to state where he last voted. Letter from Levin Nock Davis, Secretary,
State Board of Elections, Richmond, Virginia, to Donald W. Huffman, April 22,
1965. If the voter replies that he has voted before, adequate machinery exists to
have his name transferred. Va. Code Ann. §§ 24-85 -86 (Repl. Vol. 1964). The prob-
lem concerning a voter being registered in more than one precinct might occur
when a voter, either through mistake, ignorance, or intent, replies that he has not
voted before.
6Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a
Mobile Society, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 823 (1963); 77 Harv. L. Rev. 574 (1964).
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ing a voter from the registration rolls after he has moved from a pre-
cinct in which he is a registered voter. The Virginia Election Laws
provide for removal of a name from the registration list after the
expiration of thirty days from the time the voter has moved from
that precinct.7 Although this provision seems clear, many considera-
ations enter into the determination of when a person has changed
his voting residence.
The term "residence," or "resident," is used in many different
contexts. In discussing a voter residence question, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Williams v. Commonwealths stated: "The mean-
ing of these words is to be determined from the facts and circumstances
taken together in each particular case."9 The term residence, when
used to mean eligibility to vote, is generally construed as being synon-
ymous with domicile.10 The Virginia courts have followed this gen-
eral rule." Even though this rule of determining voting residence
appears well-settled, the question of what constitutes voting residence
is continually presented to the Attorney General of Virginia for clari-
fication.12 The reason it is so frequently raised seems to be the un-
certainty as to what constitutes a sufficient showing of intent to retain
domicile in one location after having physically moved to another
location.13
Although the intention of the voter appears to determine his vot-
ing residence, an analysis of cases in jurisdictions other than Virginia
shows that the intention of the voter must be evidenced by some-
thing more than a mere expression of intent. The New York Supreme
Court in Application of Woolley, 14 a case involving an attempt by
twelve persons to have their names restored to the election rolls, stated:
"Although one may properly declare an intent, the truth of such
Wa. Code Ann. § 24-17 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
" 16 Va. 272, 81 S.E. 61 (1914).
'Supra note 8, at 63.
101n i Beale, Conflict of Laws 112 (1935), in discussing residence as a qualifica-
tion for voting, it was stated: "The cases almost universally interpret residence in
election statutes as meaning domicile."
"Cooper's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 338, 93 S.E. 68o (1917); Bruner v.
Bunting, 15 Va. Law Reg. 514 (Corp. Ct. Bristol 19o9). The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia in the case of Long v. Ryan, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 718, 719-20 (1887),
defined domicile when it stated: "To constitute a domicile, two things must con-
cur-first, residence; secondly, the intention to remain there.... Domicile, therefore,
means more than residence."
2[July 1958-June 1959] Ops. Att'y Gen. of Va. 129; [July 1954-June 1955] Ops.
Atty'y Gen. of Va. 101; [July 1953-June 1954] Ops. Att'y Gen. of Va. 83; [July
1947-June 1948] Ops. Att'y Gen. of Virginia 77.
22Supra note 8.
14io8 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. Lewis County 1951).
1965]
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statement must be determined from the conduct of the person and
all attendant circumstances."15 A New Jersey Circuit Court in In re
Erickson,1 6 a case arising out of a contested election in which certain
voters' qualifications were challenged, reached a similar conclusion:
"The best and most trustworthy evidence of a voter's residence, as a
general rule, are his acts rather than his declarations concerning his
residence."' 7
These cases indicate the importance of conduct in determining
voting residence. A further survey of the various jurisdictions indi-
cates the conduct that the courts have held sufficient to establish such
residence. Although a voter absents himself from a precinct, he
may retain his voting residence there due to the nature of the absence.
Where a job is migratory in nature, such as that of a Methodist preach-
er' s or a migatory worker,' 9 it has been held that the voter does not
lose his residence because he changes his abode at regular intervals. 20
Thus, a temporary absence, where there is a definite intention to re-
turn, does not result in a loss of voter residence,2 ' even though the
absences may recur at regular intervals. 22 An absence, however, even
for a short time, which was intended to be a permanent change of
residence, does result in loss of voting residence. 23
Many of the voter residency problems confronting the courts have
arisen where a voter owns a home in more than one voting district. In
this situation, the courts have held that the voting residence is in
the district where the voter actually resides. 24 If the voter lives part
m5Supra note 4, at i69.
loa8 N.J. Misc. 5, io A.2d 142 (Cir. Ct. 1939).
T'Supra note 16, at 147.
28Everman v. Thomas, 3o3 Ky. 156, 197 S.W.2d 58 (1946).
"
1
Kay v. Strobeck, 81 Colo. 144, 254 Pac. 150 (1927).
20Owens v. Chaplin, 229 N.C. 797, 48 S.E.2d 37 (1948).
nBentley v. Wright, 303 Ky. 618, 197 S.W.2d 420, 423 (1946), moved in with
daughter to allow her to care for him while he was sick; Everman v. Thomas, 303
Ky. 156, 197 S.W.2d 58, 65 (1946), putting out a crop elsewhere; Thompson v.
Emmert, 242 Ky. 415, 46 S.W.2d 502, 503 (1932), temporary absence to enroll chil-
dren in school in another district, putting out a crop elsewhere, temporary absence
to care for sick parents; Jordon v. Overstreet, 352 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961), moved to be near doctor during pregnancy; Aldridge v. Hamlin, 184 S.W.
602, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), temporary transfer by company, temporary absence
due to poor business conditions.
"3Aldridge v. Hamlin, 184 S.W. 602, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
2nSiler v. Brown, 215 Ky. 199, 284 S.W. 997, 1003-04 (1926). Virginia case of
Dotson v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 565, 66 S.E.2d 490, 494 (1951), is also in accord
on this point.
2'Harris v. Textor, 234 Ark. 497, 361 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1962); Matney v. Elswick,
242 Ky. 183, 45 S.W.2d 1o46, 1047 (1932); Coffey v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
375 Ill. 385, 31 N.E.2d 588 (1940); Application of Woolley, io8 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup.
Ct. 1951).
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of the year in each home, however, it has been held that he has a right
to select which district he wishes to be his voting residence.235
Although the problem of determining voting residence is relatively
simple where a voter owns a home in more than one precinct, a more
acute problem arises where a voter owns a home in one district but
lives elsewhere though not owning the home where he resides. It has
been held that he votes where he lives as long as he does not definitely
plan to return to the district where he owns the residence.26 If the
voter does plan to return, however, it has been held that his voting
residence is retained in that district.27 Real property, other than a
home, is treated in the same manner. When actual residence is in one
district, a voting residence in another district may not be retained
by the mere ownership of real property in that district.28 If there is a
showing of definite plans to return to the district where the real prop-
erty is owned, such as plans to construct a house20 or an apartment 3
with the intention of dwelling therein, the voter may retain his voting
residence there. Personal property, such as household furniture,
left in the precinct from which the voter has moved can be evidence
of an intention to return.3 '
Where a voter actually resides in one district and has his busi-
ness or is employed in another district, he does not gain voter residency
by reason of his business or employment.3 2 In the case of Ingram v.
State,33 an elector was prosecuted for making a false statement as to
his residence on the voter registration certificate when he gave his
place of employment, the City Hall, as his residence rather than his
-Application of People ex rel. Croen, 2 App. Div. 2d 696, 152 N.Y.S.2d 706
(1956). See also Bentley v. Wright, 303 Ky. 618, 197 S.V.2d 420 (1946).
Felker v. Henderson, 78 N.H. 509, o02 At. 623 (1917); Application of Woolley,
io8 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Aldridge v. Hamlin, 184 S.W. 602 (Tex. Civ.
App. i9s6).
OJordan v. Overstreet, 352 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. g6i); Aldridge v.
Hamlin, 184 S.W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). A Virginia case which held this point
is Williams v. Commonwealth, 116 Va. 272, 81 S.E. 61 (1914).
Ison v. Watson, 169 Ky. i5o, 183 S.W. 468 (1916); Application of Davy, 281
App. Div. 137, 12o N.Y.S.2d 450 (1952); Application of Wooley, io8 N.Y.S.2d 165
(Sup. Ct. 195 0 .
-'Thompson v. Emmerts, 242 Ky. 415, 46 S.W.2d 502 (1932).
:Supra note 8.
3Application of Woolley, 1o8 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Aldridge v. Hamlin,
184 S.W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). A Virginia case which gives weight to this
fact is Dotson v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 565, 66 S.E.2d 490 (1951).
cPope v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 370 Ill. 196, 18 N.E.2d 214 (1938);
Johnson v. State Election Bd., 370 P.2d 551 (Okla. 1962); Ingram v. State, 275 P.2d
334 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
1275 P.2d 334 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
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actual abode. The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, in hold-
ing that a voter does not gain voter residence by reason of his em-
ployment, said that "the qualifications of electors to be entitled to vote
in Oklahoma, means to be in residence, one's place of abode, as distin-
guished from a place where one is employed or an office or place de-
voted strictly to commercial enterprise."3 4 Similarly, a patient in a hos-
pital or sanatorium gains no voter residence by virtue of his confine-
ment there.35
The above analysis of what conduct has been held to constitute
intention to retain voting residence in a precinct from which the
voter has moved his actual residence was summed up in In re Erick-
son,36 when the court said:
"To be a 'voting residence' there must be not only the inten-
tion of having the address for the purposes of voting but that
intention must be accompanied by acts of living, dwelling,
lodging or residing sufficient to reasonably establish that it is
the real and actual residence of the voter.... The voter must not
only have the intent of designating a place as his or her resi-
dence but such expression of intention must be accompanied by
acts in furtherance of that intention and those acts should be
actual." 37
With the many different circumstances which affect the determin-
ation of voter residence, it is difficult for a registrar to determine
who are qualified voters. These difficulties and the possibility that a
person could be registered in more than one voting district empha-
size the need for better control of the registration rolls. The Virginia
Election Laws do not require the removal of names from the regis-
tration rolls when a voter moves his residence from the precinct, but
only ambiguously advise when this removal can be done.38 The Elec-
tion Laws also require a purge39 of the registration books only once
every six years, although the local electoral board may direct that this
be done whenever it is deemed proper.40
It is submitted that a continuous purge should be required by
statute. Whenever a registrar has knowledge of the removal of a
Supra note 33, at 342.
3Merrill v. Shearston, 73 Colo. 230, 214 Pac. 540 (1923); Perri v. Kisselbach, 34
N.J. 84, 167 A.2d 377 (ig6i).
318 N.J. Misc. 5, io A.2d 142 (Cir. Ct. 1939).
Supra note 36, at 146-147.
38Va. Code Ann. § 24-17; §§ 24-85-86 (Repi. Vol. 1964).
"Wa. Code Ann. § 24-97 (Rep1. Vol. 1964).
4OVa. Code Ann. § 24-96 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
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voter to another voting district,41 the Election Laws should require
that the registrar, after a stated length of time, notify the voter that
his name will be removed from the registration rolls of that precinct,
unless the voter makes a sufficient showing that he definitely intends
to return to that district. This suggested change in the Election Laws
would place the burden on the voter, when challenged, to establish
his intention. It would change, in this situation, the general rule
followed in Virginia under which the burden of proving a change in
domicile is on the party alleging it.42 Such statutory change would
serve to keep the registration rolls current and to decrease the possi-
bility of a voter being registered in more than one precinct in Virginia.
DONALD W. HUFFMAN
THE GRAND JURY IN VIRGINIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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.07 Secrecy of Proceedings
.o8 Finding of Indictments and Presentments
"This presents a situation where the routine functioning of political parties
can serve local registrars. If a competitive two-party system is in operation, the
parties for their own purposes usually keep a close check on the registration rolls.
Each party is anxious to notify the registrar when members of the opposition have
died or moved. In addition to this source of information, the registrar must be a
citizen of the precinct he serves. Va. Code Ann., § 24-52 (Repl. Vol. 1964). There-
fore, he is in a good position to know when a voter dies or moves.
'2Dotson v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 565, 66 S.E.2d 490 (1951); Cooper v. Com-
monwealth, 121 Va. 338, 93 S.E. 68o (1917).
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The Grand Jury serves as an investigating agency and protects
the citizen against baseless charges. It may investigate the commission
of felonies, conditions in a community, and the conduct of public
officials. Since all proceedings of the grand jury are secret, the citizen
is protected from unfounded accusations.1
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
use of grand juries in the prosecution of federal capital and infamous
crimes2 but this amendment does not apply to the states.3
Most states provide in either their constitutions or statutes for a
grand jury. The Virginia Constitution does not require use of a grand
jury, but section eight states, in part, "That in a criminal prosecu-
tion, a man has a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusa-
tion.. .. " The Virginia Code provides that a person can be tried for
a felony only after indictment or presentment by a grand jury, but
this requirement can be waived by the accused.4
The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, pro-
hibit discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin in the selection of grand jurors. This does not mean that an
accused is entitled, as a matter of right, to a grand jury with one or
more members of his race or creed.5
While discrimination has been alleged in Virginia cases, it has
never been established. In two cases, it was not proved, and in a third
case it was alleged for the first time on retrial when the grounds for
'See the dissenting opinion in Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 867, 884,
161 S.E. 297, 302 (1931). For a discussion of the history and common law purpose
of the grand jury see Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrests to Appeal 137-42
(1947) and 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1685 (1957). For a history
of the grand jury in Virginia see Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 Va. L.
Rev. 462-71 (1959).
-Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1886).
3Hurtado v. California, iio U.S. 516 (1884).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-162 (Repl. Vol. 196o). This section states in part that,
"no person shall be put upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or present-
ment shall have first been found or made by a grand jury in a court of competent
jurisdiction or unless such person, by writing signed by such person before the court
having jurisliction to try such felony or before the judge of such court in vacation,
shall have waived such indictment or presentment, in which event he may be tried
on a warrant or information." See also Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E.
652 (1917).
5R,ogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (19o4); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
The latter case inferred but did not hold that a limitation in the number of negroes
who could serve on a grand jury was constitutional. But see Swain v. Alabama, 38o
U.S. 202 (1964).
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such allegation had existed at the first trial.6 The defendant in one
of these cases challenged the grand jury on the ground that it had
been selected only from a poll tax list. If this had been proved, the
court inferred, it would have been discriminatory. 7 In another case
the Negro defendant only charged that members of his race were ex-
cluded from the grand jury, and offered evidence of the exclusion.8
The Virginia Code provides for both general and special grand
juries; their powers are the same.9 Generally, a special grand jury is
impaneled to alleviate a special situation and so may be called as
needed.10 Thus a special grand jury is called for a special term of
court and can be carried over to the next regular term of court.:1 A
special grand jury may be summoned when the general grand jury is
found to be incompetent, so that its indictments must be quashed.' 2
It is also used to indict convicts charged with criminal offenses.' 3 It
is not necessary to enter of record the order for a special grand jury.' 4
9.00 ORGANIZATION
9.oi Number of Members
A grand jury in Virginia, regular or special, consists of not less
than five nor more than seven persons,' a reduction in number from
the grand jury of the common law, which consisted of twelve to twenty-
three members, with twelve required to indict. The size of the grand
jury is smaller in Virginia than in most states,2 perhaps because of
'Patterson v. Commonwealth, 139 Va. 589, 123 S.E. 657 (1924), error dismissed,
270 U.S. 632 (1925); Waller v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 294, 16 S.E.2d 8o8, Cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 679 (1941); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E.-d 368,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 886 (1952).
7Valler v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 294, 299, 16 S.E.2d 8o8, 81o, cert. denied,
316 U.S. 679 (1941).
"Patterson v. Commonwealth, 139 Va. 589, 6o02, 123 S.E. 657, 661 (1924), error
dismissed, 270 U.S. 632 (1925).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-147 (Repl. Vol. 196o). A court can not give a special
grand jury powers different from those of a regular grand jury. Lyles v. Common-
wealth, 88 Va. 396, 397, 13 S.E. 802 (1891).
'"a. Code Ann. § 19-1-149 (Repl. Vol. ig6o). Robertson v. Commonwealth, 1
Va. Dec. 851, 855, 20 S.E. 362, 363 (1894).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-149 (Repl. Vol. 196o). A special grand jury may be called
by a judge in vacation.
'"Shinn v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 899, 9o8 (1879).
"Va. Code Ann. § 53-298 (1950).
1'Mesmer v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 976, 981 (1875).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-150 (Rep1. Vol. 1960).
2Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 139 (1947) (hereinafter cited
as Orfield).
328 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
the absence of a constitutional basis. The reduction in the number
of grand jurors has been upheld as constitutional.
3
9.02 Qualifications
A grand juror must be at least twenty-one years of age, honest,
intelligent, of good demeanor, and in other respects qualified.4 He
must have been a citizen of Virginia for at least one year and a resi-
dent of the county or city for at least six months.5 A naturalized cit-
izen is qualified to serve as a grand juror, and the validity of the
naturalization cannot be attacked collaterally. 6 An inhabitant of a
city can not serve as a grand juror for a county circuit court unless
that court's jurisdiction extends to the city.
7
Advanced age is a ground for claiming an exemption, but it is
not a disqualification as such; therefore, a person over seventy is eligi-
ble to serve as a grand juror unless he chooses to be exempted.8
The requirement that a grand juror must be "in other respects
a qualified juror" is nebulous. An early Virginia case enumerated
factors which are now covered by statute, such as being over the age
of twenty-one and being a citizen. This case also suggested that per-
sons convicted of major felonies could not qualify as grand jurors.
To say simply that the phrase means the usual common law quali-
fications is erroneous, as some common law requirements have been
eliminatedY
An 1833 case held that one who asks to be a grand juror is not
thereby disqualified, unless it "appears" that his reason is corrupt.10 It
has been suggested that such a result would not be reached today
5Hausenfluck v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 702, 704, 8 S.E. 683, 684 (1889).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-148 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-150 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
OCommonwealth v. Towles, 32 Va. 743, 746 (18 35). Generally one must be able
to understand the English language. 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure §
1691 (1957) (hereinafter cited as 4 Wharton).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-15o (Repl. Vol. 196o).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-148 (Repl. Vol. 196o). Booth v. Commonwealth, 57 Va.
(16 Gratt.) 519, 525 (1861). In this case the age to claim exemption was sixty, but
it is assumed that the same applies with the age of seventy.
OThe phrase is found in Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-15o. In the Booth case, supra
note 8, at p. 528, the phrase was held to mean the usual common law qualifications.
This case was cited in Waller v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 294, 302, 16 S.E.2d 8o8, 8m 1
(1941), for the same proposition. The cases suggest that one who is an alien or a
minor, or who was not returned by the proper officer or at the request of the prose-
cutor is disqualified to act as a grand juror. One convicted of treason, a felony, or
perjury was also disqualified. Today, many of the common law qualifications such as
being a freeholder, are not required. In summary it appears that some common law
qualifications are still applicable while the majority are not. See 9 Michie's Juris-
prudence Virginia and West Virginia 228 (195o).
10Commonwealth v. Thompson, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 667, 668 (1883).
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"since one who requests to serve on a petit jury is disqualified," as also
is one who has someone ask for him. 1
The general rule in the absence of statute is that bias, prejudice, or
opinion regarding the defendant, or an interest other than pecuniary
in the outcome does not disqualify one as a grand juror.12 There are
no Virginia cases on this point. The oath taken in Virginia by grand
jurors takes into account that they may know the witnesses or the
defendant since they can make a presentment on their own knowl-
edge.'
3
No Virginia case discusses whether or not kinship to the accused
is a disqualification.
One can be a witness and a grand juror; this is inherent in the
functioning of the grand jury. There is a conflict as to whether one
can serve on two grand juries investigating the same offense or can
serve on the trial jury of the same offense. There is also disagreement
as to whether the complaining witness or prosecutor can be a grand
juror.14
A party must already have been indicted before he has standing
to challenge the qualification or summoning of a grand juror.15 This
objection, made by way of a plea in abatement, 16 must be made be-
fore entering a plea to the merits, or the objection is waived, 17 unless
the whole proceeding is null and void.'8 While the judge has discre-
tion to permit the withdrawal of one plea and the entry of another,
this is rarely done to allow a dilatory plea.' 9 The challenge cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.2 0
UtWhyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 Va. L. Rev. 461, 477 (1959).
214 Wharton § 1692).
"3Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-152 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
144 Wharton § 1692. During the prohibition era, a prohibition officer, at the
court's discretion, could be disqualified from grand juror service, Webb v. Common-
wealth, 137 Va. 833, 835, 120 S.E. 155, 156 (1923).
2Commonwealth v. Cherry, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 20 (1815); Commonwealth v.
Carter, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 319 (1822); Hunter v. Mathews, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 228
(1841). This is because the defendant is not a party to the organization of the grand
jury.
.Commonwealth v. Cherry, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 2o (1815); Commonwealth v.
Long, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 318 (1822); Moore v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 639
(1838).
"'Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795, (189o); Taylor v. Common-
wealth, go Va. 109, 17 S.E. 812 (1893).
'-Curtis v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 589, 593, 13 S.E. 73, 74 (1891); Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 820, 71 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1952).
"Id. In these two cases the defendant tried to enter a plea in abatement for
the first time on a retrial after reversal on appeal, but it was disallowed since the
grounds of his plea were present at the first trial.
2Taylor v. Commonwealth, go Va. 109, 113, 17 S.E. 812, 814 (1893).
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Whether one is qualified as a grand juror has been held to be a
question of fact. The defendant challenged a grand juror and the
Commonwealth replied. Since it was thus an issue in the case, the
question was for the jury.21 This result may be different today. Some
initial issues in a case have been held to involve questions of law to
be decided by the court, such as the voluntariness of a confession.
22
A grand juror may serve on more than one grand jury at the same
term of court.23 The presence of an unqualified juror on the judge's
list is not a ground to quash the indictment, if the jurors finally
chosen are qualified.2 4 It has been suggested that questions of quali-
fications are somewhat academic since a deficiency in the number of
grand jurors appearing for duty may be filled from bystanders.2 5
9.03 Compensation
A grand juror receives the same compensation and mileage allow-
ance as jurors in civil cases. This compensation is paid out of the local
tax levy.26
9.04 Summoning
In June, July, or August, each Judge of a court of general criminal
jurisdiction selects sixty persons as a panel of grand jurors for the
ensuing twelve months. They are selected from the different magister-
ial districts and wards of cities in proportion to population.
2 7
Not more than twenty days before the convening of a court re-
"Day v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 562, 563 (1845).
2Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Perhaps reasons for this decision do
not extend to the question of a grand juror's qualifications.
=Richardson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1007, ioo8 (1882). In this case a juror
served on both a special and a regular grand jury in the same term of court.
24Shinn v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 899, 907 (1879).
nWhyte, supra note ii, at 477.
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.-16o (Repl. Vol. 196o). The compensation for civil jurors
is provided for in Va. Code Ann. § 8-204 (1950). The commonwealth pays compen-
sation, fees, mileage and allowances for grand jurors of the Circuit Court of the City
of Richmond. Va. Code Ann. § ig.-161 (Repl. Vol. 1960). The Circuit Court of the
City of Richmond has jurisdiction of all criminal proceedings against convicts in
-,e penitentiary. Va. Code Ann. § 53-295 (Rep1. Vol 1958).
-Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-148 (Repl. Vol. 1960). In James City County the grand
jury is drawn from both the county and the city of Williamsburg in such propor-
tion as the judge deems proper. There appears to be no specific sources the judge
is required or forbidden to use, and presumably may consult telephone and city
directories, and choose persons he knows are willing to serve. Grand jury duty
usually requires less time than petit jury duty.
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quiring a grand jury, the clerk issues to the sheriff a venire facias2s
of not less than five or more than seven persons from the list. The
exact number is designated by the judge by an order entered of rec-
ord. When the list is made up, the clerk is required to notify the
women named, who in turn are required to notify the clerk within
fifteen days if they do not wish to serve.29
A special grand jury is summoned from a list prepared by the
judge, and not the list from which the regular grand jurors were se-
lected 3 0 A venire facias is not required.31
Vacancies on the grand jury so selected are filled by the judge from
his list, or he may dispense with the list and name bystanders. 32 If a
grand juror is legally disqualified, he must be discharged and another
sworn in his place.3 3
An objection to the method by which grand jurors are summoned
is made in the same way as an objection to qualification.3 4 The record
does not need to show that a grand juror was summoned.3 5
A fine of twenty dollars can be imposed on an officer of the court
who fails without good cause in his duty to summon a grand jury and
to return a list of their names. Likewise one who is summoned as a
grand juror and fails to appear without a "reasonable excuse" can
be fined not less than five dollars.36
9.05 Foreman
The judge appoints one of the grand jurors to be foreman.37 If one
is not appointed and sworn, objection may be made by a plea in abate-
9A venire facias is a writ to the Sheriff from the court of jurisdiction in which
the jurors are to be summoned. It has been held that a wrong date on a writ is of no
consequence as long as it is correctly complied with. Davis v. Commonwealth, 89
Va. 132, 15 S.E. 388 (1892). There is no Virginia case that considers whether a
venire facias may be dispensed with when there is an otherwise properly formed
regular grand jury.
2Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-148 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
IORobertson v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. Dec. 851, 854, 2o S.E. 362, 363 (1894);
McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 709, 716, 181 S.E. 534, 537 (1935)- The latter
case stated that the list for the special grand juries was not the list for regular grand
jurors.
slRobinson v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 903, 14 S.E. 627, 628 (1892). In this case the
objection to a lack of writ came after the verdict.
"Richardson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. ioo7 , 1oo8 (1892).
"Commonwealth v. Burton, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 645, 648 (1832).
31See note 17 supra.
GRobinson v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. goo, 9o2, 14 S.E. 627, 628 (1892).
3Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-159 (Repl. Vol. 196o). There is no Virginia case on what
constitutes a "reasonable excuse."
3'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-152 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
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ment.38 If after being sworn the foreman does not appear, another
grand juror will be so appointed.39
10.00 PROCEEDINGS
Io.oi Oath
The foreman is sworn first in the presence of the other grand
jurors, who are then sworn. Any witness to appear before the grand
jury can be sworn by the foreman.' A "de facto" clerk may swear in
a grand jury.2 Another grand juror may be sworn if a previously sworn
juror is unable or fails to appear.3
10.02 Charge
The grand jury, after being sworn, is customarily charged by the
judge of the court,4 but failure to charge will not affect an otherwise
good indictment.5 It is reversible error, however, to charge the grand
jury in the presence of the petit jury.6 After the charge, the jurors
retire to their room.7
10.03 Duties and Powers
The grand jury has power generally to investigate any crime that
may be prosecuted before the court for which it is organizeds In Vir-
ginia it has the duty to investigate and "present all felonies, misde-
meanors and violations of penal laws" in its jurisdiction, but it can-
not indict for criminal violations where the punishment is a fine of
less than five dollars.9 One case, involving misfeasance in public office,
and citing Webster's Dictionary, said that a grand jury can act on pub-
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-153 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
nTaylor v. Commonwealth, go Va. 109, 113, 17 S.E. 812, 813 (1893).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-152 (Rep1. Vol. 196o). The form of the oath administered
is given in this section.
2Hord v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 674 (1833). In this case the clerk
had not been sworn in.
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-153 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-154 (Repi. Vol. 196o).
GPorterfield v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 8oi, 802, 22 S.E. 352, 353 (1895). The
grand jury was partly charged in this case.
6Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-154 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
qIbid.
84 Wharton § 1710 (1957).
9Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-155 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
lic matters such as misfeasance in office, prevalence of crime, and
public nusiances.1o
There is no authority in Virginia as to whether the grand jury
has the power to act on complaints brought by an individual himself
when the Commonwealth's Attorney or other magistrate refuses to
act.']
There are limitations on the power over witnesses. A grand jury
cannot summon witnesses at random and make general inquiries on
the possibility that a crime has been committed. Protection from self-
incrimination and illegal search and seizure applies to witnesses before
a grand jury. Private detectives cannot be used.12
As to whether an action for libel or malicious prosecution can be
brought by the accused against a grand jury which has investigated
and fails to indict is not answered in Virginia. Such an action, if
available at all, perhaps lies against the accuser, if a private citizen.
10.04 Commonwealth's Attorney
It is the duty of "local officers" to give information to the Com-
monwealth's Attorney of the violation "of any penal law" so that he
may present evidence of such violation to the grand jury. He has
the power to issue or have issued by an authorized person summons
for any material witness to give evidence before the grand jury.13
The Commonwealth's Attorney may advise the members of the
grand jury of their duties but may not be present during its delibera-
tions, except as a sworn witness.14 His mere presence in the grand
jury room does not invalidate an indictment, in the absence of a show-
ing of prejudice to the accused.' 5
2OCutchin v. City of Roanoke, 113 Va. 452, 478, 74 S. E. 403, 409 (1912). See also
Benson v. Commonwealth, 19o Va. 744, 748, 749, 58 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1950). This
case also held it was not discriminatory to choose grand jurors from a particular
class of people if the grand jury is to investigate a situation or conditions in a
given area. There may be a question of the validity of such a ruling now.
214 Wharton § 171o. The generally accepted rule allows a private individual
to carry a complaint to a grand jury sitting as a group.
"-Id. § 1711.
"-Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-156 (Repl. Vol. ig6o). Local officers include "every Com-
missioner of Revenue, Sheriff, Constable, or other officer...."
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-156 (Repl. Vol. 1966). The Commonwealth's Attorney
should not in any way influence the grand jury's conclusion. Hall v. Commonwealth,
143 Va. 554, 560, 130 S.E. 416, 418 (1925).
'-'-ullins v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. 945, 950, 79 S.E. 324, 326 (1913); Draper v.
Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 656, 1 S.E. 471, 473 (1922).
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1O.O5 Witnesses
A witness who refuses to testify without adequate cause may be
found in contempt of court, but may refuse to testify on the ground
of self incrimination.' 6 If a witness gives testimony which subse-
quently becomes incriminatory, his privilege has not been violated.
1 7
The presence of the sheriff or his deputy in the room with the
grand jury while examining witnesses or deliberating is not grounds
for quashing the indictment.'8 Outsiders generally should not be
present during deliberations but the rule apparently does not apply
while witnesses are being examined. 19 Wharton suggests that a sten-
ographer can be present during grand jury deliberations if no preju-
dice to the accused is shown and if there is no controlling statute.20
There are no Virginia cases involving the situation where one witness
is present while another is testifying, or while the grand jury is voting.
io.o6 Accused Persons
Since the purpose of the grand jury is to accuse and not to try the
case, the accused has no right, under the common law, to appear be-
fore the grand jury nor to have the body hear witnesses in his behalf.
Apparently this rule still prevails in Virginia.
The accused has the right to call grand jurors to testify at the
trial that a state's witness testified differently before the grand jury.
21
A third party may also testify that another person's testimony given
at the trial conflicts with that given before the grand jury.
22
10.07 Secrecy of Proceedings
Traditionally grand jury proceeding have been secret so as to
protect persons investigated but not accused and so the grand jury
can operate without fear of reprisal.23
104 Wharton § 1714. See also Siklek v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 789, 793-95, 112
S.E. 605, 6o6 (1922).
'7Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881). In this case it was stated that the
witness who incriminates himself before a grand jury can invoke the privilege at his
own trial. It may be possible that the ruling in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), as regards rights to counsel extends to grand jury proceedings.
28Richardson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1oo7, 1oo 9 (1882).
"Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 573, 577, 579, io S.E. 840, 842 (1890).
'°4 Wharton § 1715.
"Harris v. Commonwealth, iio Va. 9o5, 9o6, 68 S.E. 834 (199o).
Little v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 921, 931 (1874).
"Little v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 921 (1874); Wadley v. Common-
wealth, 98 Va. 8o3, 35 S.E. 452 (igoo). See also 4 Wharton § 1719. Other reasons
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At common law a grand juror could be held guilty as an accessory
after the fact for a premature disclosure of the proceedings.2 4 In Virg-
ginia there are no statutory provisions for penalties for violations of
the rule requiring secrecy. Most likely, a violation of the rule of sec-
recy by a grand juror could constitute contempt of court.25
io.o8 Finding of Indictments and Presentments
The concurrence of at least four members is required to find an
indictment or presentment. Information on which an indictment or
presentment is based can come from two or more of the grand jurors
themselves or from witnesses, called either by the jury itself or sent
to it. If only one grand juror can testify to the event being investi-
gated, he is sworn as any other witness.
Customarily the names of persons testifying, either grand jurors
or witnesses, are listed at the foot of the indictment or presentment,26
but failure to do so does not invalidate the indictment or present-
ment.27 The omission of the names does not prevent the same witnesses
from testifying at the trial.28 Customarily the words "a true bill" are
written on the indictment and the foreman signs it, but neither are
essential to its validity. An entry of the grand jury finding in the
court's order book is sufficient.29 Yet even if this is not done, a convic-
tion is not void.30
The Virginia Code provides that an indictment may be presented
more than once, either to the same or to different grand juries, in an
effort to get a true bill.31
given for secrecy include facilitation of free disclosure by prosecutors, prevention of
the accused from fleeing, and prevention of perjury since if it were not secret the
accused might persuade the witnesses for the prosecution to falsify testimony.
2 1The State v. Fassett, 16 Conn. 457 (1844).
'4 Wharton § 1719. Some courts hold one in contempt who violates the rule
of secrecy, while others consider such a violation to be a common law misdemeanor.
-sVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-173 (Repl. Vol. 196o). For misdemeanors the prosecutor's
name must appear. Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-173 (Repl. Vol. ig6o).
2Shelton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 45o, 452, 16 S.E. 355, 356 (1892); Hall v.
Commonwealth, 143 Va. 554, 560, 130 S.E. 416, 418 (1925).
-Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (3o Gratt.) 845, 853 (1878). The case
was overruled on another point in Jones v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 63, 12 S.E. 226
(189o).
"'Hall v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 554, 561, 13o S.E. 416, 418 (1925).
!Hanson v. Smyth, 183 Va. 32 S.E.2d 142 (1944); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193
Va. 814, 71 S.E.2d 368, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 886 (1952); Council v. Smyth, 201 Va.
135, 109 S.E.2d 116 (1959).
"1Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-158 (Repl. Vol. 196o). This section also provides that:
"No irregularity in the time or manner of selecting the jurors, or in the writ of
venire facias, or in the manner of executing the same, shall vitiate any presentment,
indictment or finding of a grand jury."
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A grand jury may indict without the accused having had a pre-
liminary hearing if no arrest has been made, but after the accused has
been arrested, he is entitled to a preliminary hearing unless he waives
it in writing, before a grand jury can indict.32
Since the grand jury only accuses, it may indict if there is sufficient
evidence to establish "probable cause." 33 There is a presumption
that every indictment is found on proper evidence. Even if the indict-
ment is based on inadmissible evidence the defendant, presumably,
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34Wadley v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 803, 805, 35 S.E. 452, 453 (igoo). Whyte
suggests that this is a major fault in the grand jury since it is possible to have an
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45 Va. L. Rev. 461, 488 (1959).
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11.oo ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
11.01 Arraignment
Arraignment is the proceeding in which the accused is brought to
the bar of the court and the charge is read to him.' The accused then
answers the charge by entering a plea or making a motion.2 Judge
Lacy, in Sutton v. Commonwealth,3 succinctly set forth the steps in-
volved:
"The first step in the proceeding consists in calling him to the
bar by his name, and commanding him to stand up. The sec-
ond step is reading the indictment to him. The third step is to
ask him, 'How say you; are you guilty, or not guilty?' Techni-
cally, the arraignment is now completed, and he must answer."4
The first three steps, which are the arraignment proper,5 are the ac-
tion of the court; the last step, the plea, is the action of the accused. 6
An arraignment for a felony is mandatory,7 and the accused must
personally appear and cannot appear by attorney.8 An arraignment is
not necessary in order to convict of a misdemeanor, 9 this being a right
which may be waived by a failure to appear.10
'Stoneham v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 523, 10 S.E. 238 (1889); Sutton v. Com-
monwealth, 85 Va. 128, 7 S.E. 323 (1888); Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 6o Va.
(ig Gratt.) 640 (1870).
2Sutton v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 128, 7 S.E. 323 (1888).
3 lbid.
'85 Va. at 132, 7 S.E. at 325.
rBut see Black, Law Dictionary 139 (4 th ed. 1951), which includes the plea as
part of the arraignment.
cSutton v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 128, 7 S.E. 323 (1888); Whitehead v. Com-
monwealth, 6o Va. (I9 Gratt.) 640 (187o).
a. Code Ann. § 19.1-240 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
8
Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 6oo, 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Gilligan v. Com-
monwealth, 99 Va. 816, 37 S.E. 962 (goi); Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782,
21 S.E. 495 (1895); Coleman v. Commonwealth, go Va. 635, 19 S.E. 161 (1894);
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 679, 17 S.E. 238 (1893); Shelton v. Common-
wealth, 89 Va. 450, 16 S.E. 355 (1892); Culverius v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 787
(886); Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S.E. 149 (1887); Boswell v. Common-
wealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 86o (1871); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 6o Va. (19 Gratt.)
656 (1870'); Hooker v. Commonwealth, 54 (13 Gratt.) 763 (1855); Sperry v. Com-
monwealth, 36 (9 Leigh) 623 (1838).
OVa. Code Ann. §§ 19.1-18o and 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Foy v. Common-
wealth, 132 Va. 671, 111 S.E. 269 (1922); Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94
S.E. 168 ('917); Shiflett v. Commonwealth, go Va. 386, 18 S.E. 838 (1894).
2Souther v. Reid, ioi F. Supp. 8o6 (E.D. Va. ig1). Section 19.1-184 actually
gives the court the choice of issuing a capias or proceeding with the trial as though
the accused were present and had pleaded not guilty.
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It is not necessary to re-arraign a defendant after a change of
venue." While co-defendants may be arraigned jointly, in felony
cases each has a right to be tried separately.12 It does not appear that
defendants have any right to be tried jointly.13 There is no right to
separate trials in misdemeanor cases. 14
11.02 Motion to Appoint Counsel
The Virginia Constitution says nothing about the right to assist-
ance of counsel.' However, the right is inherent in a fair and orderly
trial,2 and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have given
it federal constitutional sanction.3 Under the Virginia statute, a per-
son charged with a felony must have counsel before he is arraigned. 4
Consequently, under this statute, at least so far as felonies are con-
cerned, it is not necessary for defendant to make a motion for appoint-
ment of counsel.3
i 1.o3 Motion for Sanity Investigation
The Virginia Code provides: "No person shall, while he is insane
or feebleminded, be tried for a criminal offense."' While it has been
said that this section is only declaratory of the common law,2 the
"Vance v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 162, 168 (1819). For motions to
change venue see § 12.10 infra.
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-202 (Repl. Vol. ig6o).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-2o2 (Repl. Vol. ig6o). At common law the Commonwealth
had the right to decide, subject to the control and discretion of the court, whether
defendants jointly indicted should be tried jointly or separately. By Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.a-202 (Repl. Vol. 196o), the defendant is given a right to elect to be tried sep-
arately. Consequently, it would seem that defendants have no right to be tried
jointly if the Commonwealth wishes to try them separately, but the point has not
been clearly settled. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 802, 23 S.E. 784, 786
(1895); Curran's Case, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 619, 627 (1850).
14Va. Code Ann. §§ s9.i-i8o and 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 196o). Jones v. Common-
wealth, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 836 (1878); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.)
938 (1874).
'Although some cases have indicated otherwise, See Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va.
681, 74 S.E.2d 81o (1953); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 67o
(1940).
Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 81o ('953); McDorman v. Smyth, i88
Va. 474, 50 S.E.2d 423 (1948); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 25o, 46 S.E.2d 406
(1948).
'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (Supp. 1964).
rhe subject is discussed in Manson, The Indigent in Virginia, 51 Va. L. Rev.
163 (1965).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-227 (Supp. 1964).
2Delp v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 564, 200 S.E. 594 (1939).
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federal courts hold that it is a federal constitutional right,3 and that
procedural due process requires that the accused be given an "ade-
quate opportunity to raise the issue."4
The Code provides that prior to arraignment the court itself, the
Commonwealth's Attorney, or counsel for the accused may move for
commitment of an accused to a state hospital for the insane for ob-
servation and report as to the accused's mental condition. Thereupon
the court may appoint qualified persons to examine the defendant
and to report their findings to the court. Whether or not such a
commission is appointed, after "hearing evidence or the representation
of counsel" the court is authorized to commit white persons to South-
western State Hospital and Negroes to Central State Hospital for
observation and report.5
If at any time after arraignment "a court in which a person is
held for trial see reasonable ground to doubt his sanity or mentality
at the time at which, but for such a doubt, he would be tried," the
court may suspend further proceedings in order to make a similar in-
quiry into the defendant's mental condition.6
The exercise of the court's discretion in determining whether to
commit the accused for a sanity investigation will not be disturbed,
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.7
When the Superintendent of the State Hospital to which an accused
has been committed reports that he is sane, or if insane that he has
been restored to sanity, he is returned for trial.8 On the other hand,
if the Superintendent reports that the accused is insane or feeble-
minded, the accused is retained in the custody of the hospital until
the further order of the court. The court may appoint a commission
of not to exceed three physicians, who may be from the staff of the
3Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.ad 934, 938 (4 th Cir. 1965); Owsley v. Cunning-
ham, 190 F. Supp. 6o8, 613 (E.D. Va. 1961).
'Ibid. In Thomas the court held in the federal habeas corpus proceedings that
on the allegations, taken to be true, the petitioner had been denied this federal
constitutional right. In Owsley, the District Court held that the constitutional right
had not been denied. For a discussion of the procedures in Virginia for raising the
issue see Comment, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 365 (1961); however, the statutes have
been rewritten since this comment was published.
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-228 (Supp. 1964).
WVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-229 (Supp. 1964).
7Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955); Delp v. Common-
wealth, 172 Va. 564, 2oo S.E. 594 (1949); Wood v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 296,
135 S.E. 895 (1926). The exercise of discretion may also be reviewed on federal
habeas corpus. Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.0d 934 (4th Cir. 1965); Owsley v.
Cunningham, i9o F. Supp. 6o8 (E.D. Va. 1961).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-230 (Supp. 1964).
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hospital, to inquire into the facts as to the mental condition of the
accused and to report.9 If this commission reports the accused to be
sane, he is returned for trial, but if it reports he is insane, the court
is required to order him to be confined in the department for the
criminal insane until restored to sanity.
10
11.04 Motion for a Continuance
A motion for a continuance may be made before or after arraign-
ment, and by statute this is declared not to be a part of the trial so
that the personal presence of the accused is not required.' The mov-
ing party, whether the Commonwealth or the accused, must show
good cause for granting the continuance, 2 and the trial court's de-
cision will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion in ruling on
the motion.3 Normally, a continuance is entered of record, but a fail-
ure to do so does not work a discontinuance of a criminal prosecution.
4
Ordinarily a continuance carries a case to the next term, but a term
may be passed over.5
If an amendment of an indictment for a felony or a misdemeanor
"operates as a surprise to the defendant" he is entitled to a contin-
uance upon request.6 A continuance will be granted for the absence
of a material witness when the following requirements are met: due
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-23o.i (Supp. 1964).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-231 (Supp. 1964).
2Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-240 (Repl. Vol. 196o); O'Boyle v. Commonwealth, loo
Va. 785, 40 S.E. 121 (19o); Kibler v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 804, 26 S.E. 858
(1897); Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 679, 17 S.E. 238 (1893); Shelton v. Com-
monwealth, 89 Va. 45o, 16 S.E. 355 (1892); Howell v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 817,
ii S.E. 238 (189o); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 77, 3 S.E. 8o3 (1887); Joyce
v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 287 (1884); Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (2o Gratt.)
860 (1871); Note, 3 Va. L. Reg. 1o7 (1897).
2Thompson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 847, 1o9 S.E. 447 (1921); Benton v.
Commonwealth, 90 Va. 328, 18 S.E. 282 (1893).
3McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 709, 181 S.E. 534 (1935); Rosenberger v.
Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 166 S.E. 464 (1932); Hurdle v. Commonwealth, 157 Va.
948, 162 S.E. 6 (1932); Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 411, 156 S.E. 577 (1931);
Parsons v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 832, 152 S.E. 547 (193o); McElroy v. Common-
wealth, 153 Va. 877, 149 S.E. 481 (1929); Lufty v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 707, 'oo
S.E. 829 (1919); Cremeans v. Commonwealth, 1o4 Va. 86o, 52 S.E. 362 (19o5); Early
v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (i8go); Howell v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
817, 11 S.E. 795 (1890); Commonwealth v. Mister, 79 Va. 5 (1884); Joyce v. Common-
wealth, 78 Va. 287 (1884); Harman v. Howe, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 676 (1876); Hewitt v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 627 (1867).
4Va. Code Ann § 19.1-185 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
rBolanz v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 31 (1873).
6Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.1-175-77 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
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diligence has been used to procure the witness;7 the testimony is
material and not merely cumulative or corroborative or sought for the
purpose of impeaching a witness for the Commonwealth; s there are
reasonable grounds for believing the witness can be secured; 9 and
the defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness. 10 The mo-
tion will be granted for absence of counsel due to death or sickness,"-
required presence as a member at a session of the General Assembly,
12
or other unavoidable circumstances.' 3 Lack of time to consult authori-
ties is a doubtful ground.' 4 The availability of the motion to delay
trial until local prejudices havte been subsided is a somewhat doubtful
ground under the Virginia authorities,'9 but it is clear that continu-
ances cannot be used as a delaying tactic.' 6
11.o5 Demurrer and Motion to Quash
A demurrer to an indictment lies only for defects apparent on
its face,' while a motion to quash lies either for a defect appearing
7Lufty v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 707, xoo S.E. 829 (1919); Early v. Common-
wealth, 86 Va. 921, ii S.E. 795 (189o); Schonberger v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 489, 10
S.E. 713 (iSgo); Hurd v. Commonwealth 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 715 (1834).
8McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 7o9, 181 S.E. 534 (1935); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 155 Va. 1ii, 156 S.E. 577 (1931); McElroy v. Commonwealth, 153 Va.
877, 149 S.E. 481 (igg); Lufty v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 707, 1oo S.E. 829 (1919);
Cremeans v. Commonwealth, 104 Va. 86o, 52 S.E. 362 (0o5); Thompson v. Com-
monwealth, 88 Va. 45, 13 S.E. 304 (i8gi); Schonberger v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
489, 1o S.E. 713 (1890).
"Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577 (1931); Thompson v.
Commonwealth, 88 Va. 45, 13 S.E. 3o4 (1891); Hurd v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.
(5 Leigh) 715 (1834).
"Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577 (1931); McElroy v. Com-
monwealth, 153 Va. 877, 149 S.E. 481 (1929); Cremeans v. Commonwealth, 1o4 Va.
86o, 52 S.E. 362 (1905).
"Kibler v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 804, 26 S.E. 858 (1897).
'-Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 166 S.E. 464 (1932); Kibler v. Com-
monwealth, 94 Va. 804, 26 S.E. 858 (1897).
13Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577 (1931).
2"Wright v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 872, 77 S.E. 503 (1913).
"5Joyce v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 287 (1884).
"Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. Il, 156 S.E. 577 (1931); McElroy v. Com-
monwealth, 153 Va. 877, 149 S.E. 481 (1929); Cremeans v. Commonwealth, 104 Va.
86o, 52 S.E. 363 (igo5); Welch v. Commonwealth, go Va. 318, 18 S.E. 273 (1893);
Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 1i S.E. 795 (189o); Harman v. Howe, 68 Va.
(227 Gratt.) 676 (1876); Hewitt v. Commonwealth, r8 Va. (17 Gratt.) 627 (1867);
Wormeley v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (1o Gratt.) 658 (1853).
1
Hagood v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 918, 162 S.E. 10 (1932); Woods v. Common-
wealth, 140 Va. 491, 124 S.E. 458 (1924); Gilreath v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 709, 118
S.E. 1oo (1923); Watts v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 872, 39 S.E. 706 (19o0); Crump v.
Commonwealth, 98 Va. 833, 23 S.E. 760 (1895); Early v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 765,
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on its face or for a defect outside the indictment. 2 Both must be en-
tered before the defendant pleads in bar,3 but the court may allow
withdrawal of a plea in order to make a motion to quash,4 and the
trial court's error in overruling a demurrer is not waived by entering
a plea in bar.5
By demurring, the defendant admits facts well pleaded to be true
and asserts that the indictment charges no offense,6 the court is with-
out jurisdiction, 7 or the statute on which the indictment is based is
unconstitutional.8 When there are several counts, the defendant may
demur to the faulty ones only.0 A demurrer must specify the grounds
on which it is based,10 but it does not have to be in writing." A
general demurrer will be overruled if there is one good count to an
indictment, 12 and the Supreme Court of Appeals will not consider an
assignment of error based on overruling a demurrer unless the record
shows the specific grounds on which it was based.
13
A motion to quash may be used to raise a question as to whether
the indictment charges an offense,14 whether the court has jurisdic-
tion,15 and whether there has been a misjoinder of offenses.16 An
24 S.E. 936 (1896); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 795 (1843); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, 4 Va. (2 Va. Gas.) 5o (1826).
2 Watts v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 872, 39 S.E. 706 (19o); Snodgrass v. Com-
monwealth, 89 Va. 679, 17 S.E. 238 (1893); Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11
S.E. 795 (1890); Shifflet, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 642 (1858).
3Pflaster v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 457, 141 S.E. 115 (1928); Richards v. Corn-
monwealth, 81 Va. iio (1885).
TPflaster v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 457, 141 S.E. 115 (1928); Richards v. Com-
monwealth, 81 Va. 110 (1885); Commonwealth v. Tyree, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 262
(1821).
ri Lee, Criminal Trial in the Virginias § 82 (1940).
6
Stanley v. Town of Clintwood, 143 Va. 540, 129 S.E. 257 (1925); Rose v. Com-
monwealth, 116 Va. 1023, 82 S.E. 699 (1914); Henricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.
934 (1914)
•
7Ryan v. Commonwealth, 8o Va. 385 (1885).
sPine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-255 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
2
0
Jolly v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 756, 118 S.E. 109 (1923).
-Va. Code Ann. § 8-99 (Repi. Vol. 196o).
'-Stanley v. Town of Clintwood, 143 Va. 540, 129 S.E. 257 (1925); Rose v. Com-
monwealth, n6 Va. 1023, 82 S.E. 699 (1914); Henricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.
934 (1882).
-Va. Rule 1:8; Saunders v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 1ooo, 45 S.E.2d 307 (1947);
Hagood v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 918, 162 S.E. 10 (1932); Boyd v. Commonwealth,
156 Va. 934, 157 S.E. 546 (1931).
'"Huff v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 648 (1858); Bell v. Commonwealth,
49 (8 Gratt.) 600 (1851); Commonwealth v. Clark, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 675 (1849).
'5Bell v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 6oo (1851).
'-Pflaster v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 457, 141 S.E. 115 (1928); Pine v. Common-
wealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917); Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 374
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
indictment will not be quashed for the omission of words of mere form
or for the insertion of surplusage.17
i i.o6 Motion to Amend an Indictment
Amendments of indictments are covered by three sections of the
Code,' whose effect is to cut down on unnecessary delay in placing
a defendant on trial,2 but the distinction between a defective and an
invalid indictment remains. 3 An indictment for a misdemeanor may be
amended, so long as the nature of the offense charged is not changed,
at any time before judgment.4 Similarly, an indictment for a felony
may be amended, so long as the character of the offense is not changed,
at any time before3 or during the trial.6 If amendment is made
after the defendant pleads, he must be given an opportunity to plead
anew, after having the amended indictment read to him.7 If an
amendment operates as a surprise to the defendant he is entitled to a
continuance upon request.8 The Statute of Jeofailes also provides for
the amendment of indictments in case of misnomer.9
11.07 Motion for Bill of Particulars
The purpose of a bill of particulars is set forth in Livingston v.
Commonwealth' in the following language:
"It is true the bill of particulars is not for the purpose of
charging the offense. The indictment must do that. The accused
(1886); Richards v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 11o (1885); Lazier v. Commonwealth, 51
Va. (1o Gratt.) 708 (1853); Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 727 (1852).
17Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-17a (Repl. Vol. 196o); Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186
Va. 765, 43 S.E.2d 890 (1947); McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 429, 4 S.E.2d
768 (1939); Young v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1152, 156 S.E. 565 (1931); Common-
wealth v. Woodson, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 669 (1839).
'Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.1-175 -177 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
Wa. Code of 1919, § 4877, Revisor's Note.
3Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-175 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-176 (Rep. Vol. 196o). Before this section was adopted there
was no way to amend an indictment to remedy defects so as to meet the require-
ment of § 8 of the Virginia Constitution of informing the accused of the nature of
accusation. Woods v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 491, 124 S.E. 458 (1924).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-177 (Repl. Vol. 196o). Livingston v. Commonwealth, 184
Va. 830, 36 S.E.2d 561 (1946); Brookman v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 522, 145 S.E.
358 (1928); Owsley v. Cunningham, 19o F. Supp. 6o8 (E.D. Va. 1961).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-177 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
8Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.1-175 -177 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-172 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
1184 Va. 830, 36 S.E.2d 561 (1946).
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cannot be tried upon a bill of particulars alone. However, the
bill of particulars and the indictment must be read together.
The function of the bill of particulars is to supply additional
information concerning an accusation. The decisive considera-
tion in each case is whether the matter claimed to be left out of
the indictment has resulted in depriving an accused of a substan-
tial right and subjects him to the danger of being tried upon a
charge for which he has not been indicted.
2
Although the indictment may be good against a demurrer, it may not
provide the defendant with the information necessary for him to
make a defense,3 and so it is necessary to a fair and orderly trial.
4
However, a bill of particulars cannot correct an invalid indictment.5
A motion for a bill of particulars must be made before the defen-
dant pleads to the merits. 6 The bill must particularize the charges
which the prosecution expects to support with evidence.7 It is in-
sufficient if it merely repeats the charge as set forth in the indictment. 8
A bill may be amended by the court.9 The exercise of the trial court's
discretion in denying the motion will be upheld unless there is an
"affirmative showing that defendant was prejudiced by the failure of
the court to require a bill of particulars."'o
Since the defendant may secure additional information by seek-
ing a bill of particulars, the statutory form of indictment for murder
and manslaughter, which lays the charge in very general terms,
has been upheld." Under the Virginia statutory scheme which makes
all forms of theft and receiving stolen goods indictable as larceny,
the defendant is entitled to a statement in writing from the the Com-
monwealth's Attorney specifying the statute on which he intends to
2 d. at 837, 36 S.E.2fd at 565.
3Hagood v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 918, 162 S.E. 10 (1932); Pine v. Common-
wealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917).
AHagood v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 918, 162 S.E. 1o (1932); Wilkerson v.
Commonwealth, 122 Va. 920, 95 S.E. 388 (1918); Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va.
812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917).
5Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917); Wilkerson v. Com-
monwealth, 122 Va. 920, 95 S.E. 388 (1918); Note, 3 Virginia L. Reg (N.S.) 953 (1918).
'Boyd v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 934, 157 S.E. 546 (1931).
1Casper v. City of Danville, 16o Va. 929, 169 S.E. 734 ('933).
"Casper v. City of Danville, i6o Va. 929, 169 S.E. 734 (1933); Hudgins v. Com-
monwealth, 142 Va. 628, 128 S.E. 565 (1925); Webster v. Commonwealth, 141 Va.
589, 127 S.E. 377 (1925).
9jennings v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 726, 112 S.E. 6o2 (1922).
10Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. at 569, 138 S.E.2d at 297 (1964). See also
Riner v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 9o, 134 S.E. 542 (1926); Allen v. Commonwealth,
122 Va. 834, 94 S.E. 783 (1918); Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652
(1917).2 Hurd v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 88o, 165 S.E. 536 (1932).
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rely for conviction. 12 If the defendant fails to make the request the
Commonwealth's Attorney may ask for a conviction under either
statute.
13
i 1.o8 Motion to Suppress Evidence
There is as yet no Virginia statutory and case law on this motion.
Until the United States Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio'
Virginia had been following the state rule under which even illegally
seized evidence was admissible in evidence. 2 So far the exclusionary
rule has been given effect by motions to exclude illegally seized evi-
dence at the trial rather than by a motion to suppress evidence prior
to trial.3
11.o9 Motion for Change of Venue
Section 19.1-224 of the Code authorizes the court to order a
change of venue upon motion of either the accused or the Common-
wealth. The motion may be made in the absence of the accused by
a petition signed and sworn to by him, which petition may be acted
upon by the court in vacation.' The burden is on the defendant to
show to the court's satisfaction that good cause exists for changing
the venue.2 An accused's fears and belief alone are insufficient, but
the facts must be established by independent and disinterested evi-
dence.3 The court's denial of a motion for change of venue will not be
'-Va. Code Ann. § 18.i-iog (Repl. Vol. 196o).
"Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 710, 112 S.E. 624 (1922).
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154 (1924); Casey v. Common-
wealth, 138 Va. 714, 121 S.E. 513 (1924).
'See Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, i3o S.E.2d 437 (1963), rev'd 377 U.S.
158 (1964); Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962), cert. denied
372- U.S. 946 (1963).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-224 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
'Farrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353, 8o S.E.2d 312 (1955); Maxwell v. Com-
monwealth, 169 Va. 886, 193 S.E. 587 (1937); Evans v. Commonwealth, 161 Va.
992, 170 S.E. 756 (1933); Webb v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 866, 152 S.E. 366 (1930);
Wood v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 296, 135 S.E. 895 (1926); Parsons v. Common-
wealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 68 (1924); Rudd v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 783,
i1iS.E. 270 (1922); Thompson v. Commonweath, 131 Va. 847, 109 S.E. 447 (1921).
Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 38 S.E.2d 485 (1946); Evans v. Common-
wealth, 161 Va. 992, 170 S.E. 756 (1933); Rudd v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 783,
"'i S.E. 270 (1922); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 847, io9 S.E. 447 (1921);
Bowles v. Commonwealth, 1o3 Va. 816, 48 S.E. 527 (1904); Wormeley v. Common-
wealth, 51 Va. (io Gratt.) 658 (1853).
19651
346 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion. 4 In one in-
stance there is a right to change of venue. This is when the mayor of a
city or sheriff of a county has called upon the Governor for military
force to protect the accused from violence. The court is then required
to order a change of venue at once, upon petition, signed and sworn
to by the accused.5
A defendant may seek a change of venue because of difficulty in
obtaining an impartial jury or because of local prejudice. When the
allegation is that an impartial jury cannot be secured, the defendant
must first take advantage of section 19.1-212 and move to obtain
jurors from another county or city. 6 If an impartial jury is obtained
by this means, it is clear that a change of venue was unnecessary.
7
However, if the defendant seeks a change of venue because of local
prejudice, it is not then necessary to move first to obtain jurors from
another county.8
If the motion for change of venue is granted the court may admit
the defendant to bail, to appear on a certain day before the court to
which the case is removed, or if not, remand him to custody and
order his removal to the jail of the court where the case is to be
tried.9
'Farrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353, 89 S.E.2d 312 (1955); Slayton v. Com-
monwealth, 185 Va. 371, 38 S.E.2d 485 (1946); Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 169 Va.
886, 193 S.E. 507 (1937); Evans v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 992, 170 S.E. 756 ('933);
Webb v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 866, 152 S.E. 366 (1930); Parsons v. Common-
wealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 68 (1924); Rudd v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 783, 111
S.E. 270 (1922); Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. 921, 78 S.E. 625 (1913).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-224 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
"Rudd v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 783, 1" S.E. 270 (1922); Looney v. Common-
wealth, 115 Va. 921, 78 S.E. 625 (1913); Jones v. Commonwealth, iii Va. 862, 69
S.E. 953 (1911); Waller v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 492, 5 S.E. 364 (1880); Joyce v.
Commonwealth, 78 Va. 287 (1884); Wright v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 88o
(188o).
Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 38 S.E.2d 485 (1946); Maxwell v.
Commonwealth, 169 Va. 886, 193 S.E. 507 (1937); Webb v. Commonwealth, 154 Va.
866, 152 S.E. 366 (1930); Wood v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 296, 135 S.E. 895 (1926);
Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 68 (1923); Taylor v. Common-
wealth, 122 Va. 886, 94 S.E. 795 (1918); Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. 921, 78
S.E. 625 (1913); Bowles v. Commonwealth, 1o3 Va. 816, 48 S.E. 527 (1904); Joyce
v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 287 (1884); Wright v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.)
880 (1880).
8Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862, 69 S.E. 953 (igi1); Burton v. Common-
wealth, 107 Va. 931, 6o S.E. 55 (9o8); Uzzle v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 919, 6o S.E.
52 (1908).
The fact that influential citizens have raised a fund by private subscription
and then employed counsel to aid in the prosecution of the accused has been held
not a ground for a change of venue. Rudd v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 783, 111
S.E. 270 (1922); Wormeley v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (io Gratt.) 658 (1853).
OVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-225 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
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11.1o Motion to Waive Trial by jury
Trial by jury may be waived in both felony' and misdemeanor
cases.2 When the jury is waived, the court shall try the case.3 Upon
a plea of not guilty, with accused's consent after advice of counsel
and the consent of the Commonwealth's Attorney and the court, the
jury trial will be waived. A minor has the same right to waive jury
trial as an adult.4
12:00 PLEAS
12.01 General
An accused may enter two types of pleas: dilatory and in bar.'
A dilatory plea is a delaying tactic not going to the merits, which plea,
if sustained, disposes of the present charges but is not a bar to later
prosecution for the same offense.2 Dilatory pleas are of two kinds:
plea to the jurisdiction 3 and plea in abatement.4 In Virginia, all dila-
tory pleas, including a plea to the jurisdiction, are referred to as
pleas in abatement. A plea in bar goes to the merits of the case; and
if sustained disposes of the case finally.5 By entering the plea, a de-
fendant waives all dilatory pleas.6 He undertakes by the production of
evidence to establish that the charge cannot be maintained.7
Pleas in bar may be filed at the same time as pleas in abatement
"or within a reasonable time thereafter; but the issues on the pleas in
abatement shall be first tried."8 This changes the common law rule that
dilatory pleas must precede pleas in barY All pleas, both in bar and
in abatement, must show matter which if confessed by demurrer or
found by the jury will give the judgment prayed by the plea.10
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-192 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
-Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-193 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
3Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641 (1941); Boaze v. Common-
wealfth, 165 Va. 786, 183 S.E. 263 (1936).
'Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641 (1941).
11 Lee, Criminal Trial in the Virginias § 75 (1940).
2Ibid.
'A motion to quash the indictment or a demurrer may serve the same purpose.
Id. at § 77
'Id. at § 75.
'Ibid.
"Curtis v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 589, 13 S.E. 73 (1891); Early v. Commonwealth,
86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890).
7Tilley v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 136, 15 S.E. 526, 531 (1892).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-242 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
T'he statute became effective in 1919. See the Revisor's Note to Va. Code
§ 6107.
"J'Tilley v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 136, 15 S.E. 526 (1892); Smith v. Common-
wealth, 85 Va. 924, 9 S.E. 148 (1889) (a plea presenting in different language an issue
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A plea in felony cases is mandatory." The accused must enter it
personally, and the record must so show.'.2 The court enters a plea of
not guilty when one charged with a felony refuses to plead.13 A plea
is not necessary in misdemeanor cases,' 4 but if the accused is present
when his case is called, he must plead or waive the right.' 5 The court
enters a plea of not guilty when one charged with a misdemeanor does
not appear and plead.'
6
The withdrawal of a plea already entered is within the discretion
of the court and may be allowed if it does not violate any positive
rule of law or established practice.' 7 It is rarely awarded to allow the
substitution of a dilatory plea.' 8 When a motion for withdrawal is
refused, such action will not be reversed on appellate review unless
there has been an abuse of discretion.' 9
12.02 Plea in abatement
A plea in abatement is a dilatory plea which is made on account
of defects apparent on the face of the record or for defects based on
matter extrinsic to the record. It is a dilatory plea and not favored,
but when sustained the prosecution abates, although without bar-
ring a subsequent prosecution' The plea must be made before or at
the time of pleading to the merits, 2 although the court may permit
already presented in another plea is rightly rejected); Moran v. Commonwealth, 36
Va. (9 Leigh) 651 (1839) (if averments are omitted which are necessary to show
the matter of the plea, the omission is fatal).
"Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E. 5o (1932).
"Sperry v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 623 (1838).
13Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-240 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Whitehead v. Commonwealth,
6o Va. (19 Gratt.) 640 (1879).
14Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Royals v. City of Hampton, 201
Va. 552, 111 S.E.2d 795 (196o); Foy v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 671, "1 S.E. 269
(1922); Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168 (1917).
";Royals v. City of Hampton, 201 Va. 552, 111 S.E.2d 795 (196o); Bare v. Com-
monwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. I68 (917).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 196o). See § 12.11, infra, as to when the
court may enter judgment as if the accused had confessed his guilt.
'7Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E.2d 368 (1952); Parris v. Com-
monwealth, 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 (1949); Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 817,
36 S.E. 399 (igoo); Watson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 6o8, 13 S.E. 22 (1891); Curtis
v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 589, 13 S.E. 731 (1891); Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890); Commonwealth v. Scott, 51 Va. (io Gratt.) 749 (1853).
'8Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890).
"1See cases cited in note 17 supra.
'Tilley v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 136, 15 S.E. 526 (1892); Commonwealth v. Long,
4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 318 (1822); Day v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. (2 Gratt.) 562 (1845).
'Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E.2d 368, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
886 (1952); Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 817, 36 S.E. 399 (igoo); Taylor v. Coin-
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withdrawal of a plea in bar in order to permit the defendant to enter
a plea in abatement.3 The plea must be in writing and under oath.4
A plea in abatement may be used to raise questions of venue,5 or
the organization of the grand jury or qualifications of the grand
jurors." A plea in abatement is no longer available to challenge the
indictment on the ground of misnomer r
Rule 1:8 provides that "In criminal cases questions of venue must
be raised in the trial court and before verdict in cases tried by a jury
and before judgment in cases tried by the court sitting without a
jury."8 While this Rule appears to extend the time for raising
questions of venue, it has so far only been applied to bar raising a
venue question for the first time in the Supreme Court of Appeals.9
12.03 Plea of Guilty
Under section 19.1-192 of the Code a plea of guilty of a felony must
be tendered in person after being advised by counsel.1 However, the
requirement is statutory and may be waived.2 In the case of a mis-
demeanor the plea of guilty may be tendered by the accused in person
or by counsel.3 Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court should be
sure that the accused is competent and aware of the subsequent effect
monwealth, 90 Va. 109, 17 S.E. 812 (1893); Curtis v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 589,
13 S.E. 73 (1891); Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (189o).
'Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 817, 36 S.E. 399 (19oo); Early v. Commonwealth,
86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890).
'Commonwealth v. Sayers, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 723 (1837).
uRandall v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182, 31 S.E.2d 571 (1944); Farewell v. Com-
monwealth, 167 Va. 475, 189 S.E. 321 (1937); Bausell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va.
669, 181 S.E. 453 (1935); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 939, 161 S.E. 919 (1932);
Hodge v. City of Winchester, 153 Va. 904, 150 S.E. 392 (1929). See also Va. Rule 1:8.
OBailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E.2d 368, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
886 (1952); McCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 870, 49 S.E. 623 (1905); Early v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, i S.E. 795 (189o); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
573, 1o S.E. 84o (189o); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1007 (1882); Day v.
Commonwealth, 42 Va. (2 Gratt.) 562 (1845); Moore v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9
Leigh) 639 (1838); Kerby v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 747 (1836); Common-
wealth v. Long, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 318 (1822); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 4 Va.
(-0 Va. Cas.) 20 (18l5).
Wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-172 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
Wa. Code Ann. Rule 1:8 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
"Hicks v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 939, 161 S.E. gig (1932); Boyd v. Common-
wealth, 156 Va. 934, 157 S.E. 546 (1931).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-192 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
2Va. Const. art. I, § 8; Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-192 (RepI. Vol. 196o); Cottrell
v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948); Gross v. Smyth, 182 Va. 724,
30 S.E.2d 570 (1944).
OVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-193 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
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of such a plea and that it is freely, understandingly, and voluntarily
made.4 But the court's failure to inquire directly of the defendant,
even though he was erroneously advised by counsel, whether he un-
derstands the possible consequences of such a plea is not necessarily a
fatal error, this depending on the facts of the case.5 Rules for fel-
onies and misdemeanors are the same.0 The consent of the Common-
wealth is not required in either felonies7 or misdemeanors. 8 If the
indictment is founded on a violation of the gambling or public rev-
enue laws, or if the accused fails to appear and plead the court may
pass judgment as if the defendant had pleaded guilty.9
A plea of guilty equals a conviction and subjects the accused to
the full legal penalty for the offense, as if tried and convicted.10 There
is no need for proof of guilt." All defenses except that no offense is
charged are waived. 12 The accused has a right to have punishment fixed
by the court, and so the court cannot impanel a jury for this pur-
pose.' 3 Evidence may be introduced to aid the court in determining
the sentence to be imposed.' 4
A plea of guilty goes to all counts of the indictment, reaching the
good ones, if there are both good and bad counts. 1 It goes to the
highest degree of the offense charged.16
'Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861, 134 S.E. 591 (1926).
'McGrady v. Cunningham,. 296 F.2d 6oo (4th Cir. 196i).
OMcGrady v. Cunningham, 296 F.2d 6oo (4th Cir. 1961) (involved a felony);
and Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861, 134 S.E. 591 (1926) (involved a
misdemeanor).
Wa. Const. art. I, § 8; Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-192 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Cottrell v.
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va.
1o98, 172 S.E. 277 (1934).
8Va. Const. art. I, § 8; Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-193 (Repl. Vol. ig6o).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
1 Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948); Hobson v.
Youell, 177 Va. 9o6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941); Granger v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 212
(1883).
uAs regards murder see, Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-250 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Hobson
v. Youell, 177 Va. go6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941).
12Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948).
"Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948); Hobson v. YouelU,
177 Va. 9o6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277
(1934); Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861, 134 S.E. 591 (1926); McGrady
v. Cunningham, 296 F.2d 6oo (4th Cir. 1961).
"'Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 9o6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941); Granger v. Commonwealth,
78 Va. 212 (1883).
15Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 9o6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941).
16Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 9o6, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941); Williams v. Commonwealth,
128 Va. 698, 1o4 S.E. 853 (192o), discussed in Note, 6 Va. L. Reg. (N.s.) 456 (1920);
McGrady v. Cunningham, 296 F.2d 6oo (4th Cir. 1961).
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
12.04 Plea of Nolo Contendere
This plea is available in Virginia, as at common law, but it will
not be accepted except for light misdemeanors.' The plea constitutes
an admission of guilt for the particular prosecution, but not for any
other proceeding growing out of the same incident.
12.05 Plea of Not Guilty
A plea of not guilty puts in issue every allegation of the indict-
ment, which includes the defendant's guilt of the offense charged.'
The defense of insanity at the time of the act may be made under
this plea.2
If the defendant refuses to plead, the plea of not guilty is entered
for him in all felony cases, 3 and in all misdemeanor cases, except for
violations of the gambling and public revenue laws in which instances
the court may try the defendant as though he had pleaded guilty.4 The
court in its discretion may permit the withdrawal of the plea of not
guilty.5
12.o6 Plea of Denial of Speedy Trial
Every one who has been indicted for a felony and has been held
for trial, whether in jail or not, is discharged forever from prosecu-
tion for that offense if three regular terms of a circuit court, or four
of a hustings or corporation court, pass without trial.' The defense
is raised by a plea that is analogous to and has the same effect as a
plea of former jeopardy.2 Proof that accused remained silent or did
not demand trial nor object to a motion for a continuance by the
1Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 1 6 2 S.E. 50 (1932), discussed in Note,
18 Va. L. Rev. 693 (1932).
lpotts v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 732, 73 S.E. 470 (1912); Thomas v. Common-
wealth, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 912 (1872).
2McLane v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 16 S.E.2d 274 (196o); Wood v. Com-
monwealth, 146 Va. 296, 135 S.E. 895 (1926); Stover v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 780,
22 S.E. 874 (1895); Baccigalupo v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 807 (1880);
Owsley v. Cunningham, i9o F. Supp. 6o8 (E.D. Va. 1961).
WVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-240 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.
(2o Gratt.) 86o (1871).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
rBailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E. 368; cert. denied, 344 U.S.
886 (1952); Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 817, 36 S.E. 399 (1900); Watson v.
Commonwealth, 87 Va. 6o8, 13 S.E. 22 (1891); Curtis v. Commonwealth, 87 Va.
589, 13 S.E. 731 (1891); Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (189o);
Commonwealth v. Scott, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 749 (1853).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-191 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
2
Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 Va. L. Reg. 5o9 (1g1).
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Commonwealth is not sufficient to overcome his prima facie case under
the statute.
3
12.07 Plea of Former Jeopardy
The Virginia Constitution guarantees that one charged with a
crime shall not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.' The
defense is raised by a special plea of former acquittal or conviction,2
sworn to,3 in writing.4 The defense may be waived, either expressly
or impliedly,5 and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.0 The
plea must show in what court the accused was tried, the time, the
specific offense charged, the acquittal or conviction, or other circum-
stances constituting double jeopardy. The accused must definitely and
substantially show by the allegations of his plea that there was an
identity of the two offenses both in law and in fact, and that he is
the same person as was formerly in jeopardy7
A plea of former jeopardy if good in substance, even though in-
formal, will be sustained on demurrer.8 However, when the prior
indictment was void, no jeopardy ever attached, and so the plea
should be overruled.9 If the former trial was in another court and
'Howell v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 894, 45 S.E.2d 165 (1947); Flanary v. Com-
monwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945).
1Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
2
Royals v. City of Hampton, 20o Va. 552, 111 S.E.2d 795 (196o); Reaves v.
Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 65 S.E.2d 559 (1951); Driver v. Seay, 183 Va. 273, 32
S.E.2d 87 (1944); Seymour v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 775, 112 S.E. 806 (1922).
3Sigmon v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 258, 105 S.E.2d 171 (1958).
'Sigmon v. Commonwealth, oo Va. 258, 105 S.E.2d 171 (1958); Reaves v. Com-
monwealth, 192 'Va. 443, 65 S.E.2d 559 (1951); Driver v. Seay, 183 Va. 273, 32 S.E.2d
87 (1944); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); DeBoer v.
Commonweath, 147 Va. 671, 137 S.E. 469 (1927).
5Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62 (1941); Benton v. Common-
wealth, 91 Va. 782, 21 S.E. 495 (1895); Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554 (1886).
ORoyals v. City of Hampton, 20o Va. 552, 111 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Zimmerman v.
Commonwealth, 148 Va. 745, 138 S.E. 569 (1927); Owens v. Commonwealth, 129
Va. 757, 105 S.E. 531 (192 1).
7Sigmon v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 258, lO5 S.E.2d 171 (1958); Reaves v. Com-
monweath, 192 Va. 443, 65 S.E.2d 559 (1951); DeBoer v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 671,
137 S.E. 469 (1927); Commonwealth v. Allen, 18 Va. L. Reg. 410 (1912); Justice v.
Commonwealth, 81 Va. 209, appeal dismissed, 136 U.S. 639 (1885); Commonwealth
v. Somerville, 3 Va. (i Va. Cas.) 164 (i8io).
8Day v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 915 (1873).
'Dulin v. Lillard, 91 Va. 719, 20 S.E. 821 (1895); Richards v. Commonwealth,
81 Va. 11o (1885); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 866 (1879); Ran-
dall v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 644 (1874).
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the plea does not set forth the essential allegations, it should be over-
ruled.'0
Double jeopardy is also covered by statute," which involves the
same procedures. 12
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uVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-259 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
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